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PRIVATIZATION, CO-OPERATION AND
SUSTAINABILITY – UNDERSTANDING THE
IMPLICATIONS OF LAND-REFORM IN GOA
Across the developing world the way in which land is
controlled and managed has been steadily changing.
In the past fifty years, community ownership has
increasingly given way to privatization. The impact of
this change on social equity and on the environment is
a key issue that interests conservationists and
politicians alike.
A new SANDEE study looks at land re-distribution and privatization in
India. Combining information from a field survey with historical research,
the study analyses tradeoffs that came about after communal land is
transferred to individual tenants. The study finds that new land-owners
in Goa were unable to cooperate to finance the environmental
protection measures that had been carried out under communal
ownership. The subsequent decline in agricultural productivity and
environmental sustainability led many farmers – especially those who
had been in charge of traditional resource management - to leave
their land. This study highlights the importance of traditional land
management networks in any policy decisions related to land
ownership. It suggests that providing security of tenure is not sufficient
to guarantee sustainable environmental management.
The study is the work of Pranab Mukhopadhyay from the Department
of Economics at Goa University. In his report Mukhopadhyay looks at
the impact of land ownership changes that took place in Goa during
the 1960s.
Goa, a small state in Western India, was one of the earliest (and last)
European colonies in India (1510-1961). It has a long history of
community land ownership and management. Prior to 1961, when
Goa joined the Indian Union, a large part of the state’s “recovered”
lands and hill tracts were owned by a community institution called the
Communidade. The original settlers of the village were called Gaunkars
and male descendents were given this title on reaching adulthood.
The Gaunkars laid joint claim to the ownership of village Communidade
lands.  The right to use these lands for agricultural purposes was
periodically distributed to tenants through auctions.  Auction rents
financed public works such as the
maintenance of embankments
and sluice gates. This work was
vital for soil protection and
agricultural productivity
enhancement.
In 1964, tenancy legislation was
introduced in Goa. These land
reforms gave security of tenure to
tenants. Tenants were given the
right to purchase land at fixed rates
to convert their tenancy claims to
ownership rights. This amounted to
the virtual privatization of the
Communidade lands, which were
till then common property in the




To investigate the social and
environmental impacts of the
empowerment of the tenants, the
dis-mantling communidades of
and the dis-enfrachisement of the
Gaunkars, Mukhopadhyay asks
two questions: Does a more equal
ownership of agricultural land
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make cultivators more amenable to cooperate to improve productivity?
And does the privatization of common land lead to greater ecological
sustainability?
These questions are at the centre of an on-going debate about land
ownership, conservation and social equity. It is often argued that security
of tenure is a key factor that will make people willing to invest in
environmental conservation work. Mukhopadhyay aims to find out
whether land asset re-distribution in Goa actually had this effect or
whether it led to a reduction in the common good.
GETTING THE LAND OWNERSHIP PICTURE
A field study was used to get an understanding of the current state of the
agrarian economy in Goa and, juxtaposing this with various pieces of
secondary information, to assess the impact of land-ownership changes.
Households from four villages were interviewed. Three villages were
chosen from North Goa (Goltim, Malar and Calangute) and one from
South Goa (Curtorim). These villages were selected to represent different
agro-economic zones and different levels of economic development.
In each village 90 households were randomly selected from three key
agro-economic categories – Gaunkars (the male descendents of original
village settlers), the tenants who rented Communidade lands on auction
and the Mundkars who were employed on private agricultural lands.
The survey was designed to provide information on: (a) The current land
holding structure, (b) the extent of fallow land caused by salinity (as an
indicator of changes in farm productivity), and (c) how many people had
left the agrarian economy following the change in tenancy legislation.
SALINITY AND MIGRATION
Comparing the current land ownership situation with how things were
before the tenancy legislation came into effect, it is apparent that tenants




communidades for the colonial period
indicates that these village level
institutions played a very important
role in the agrarian economy of Goa.
Some argue that till not so long ago,
the entire agricultural area was owned
by the communidades. The process
of creation of private cultivable lands
happened mainly during the
Portuguese period when land grants
were made by the colonial state to
expand its support base, and in later
decades (1540 onwards) when the
Portuguese crown undertook
Inquisition in all its colonies to
encourage religious conversion. The
financial buoyancy of the
communidade depended on the
productivity of its lands.
The communidades used to undertake
a variety of the soil conservation and
productivity-enhancing activities,
including maintenance of
embankments, de-silting of rivulets,
etc.   These activities were
undertaken out of the profits earned
from the public auctions of cultivation
rights. In 1964 the government
enacted the Goa Tenancy Act, which
took the powers of land auction out
of the hands of the communidades
and transferred the responsibility for
embankment maintenance to
tenants. After tenancy reform, there
were little or no revenues accruing
to the communidades and they were
financially defunct.
Table: Persons with Family Abroad and Receiving Foreign Remittances
(Current Survey Data Results)
Category Households Probability of Households Proportion of
(90 persons with family having a family receiving foreign members abroad
interviewed in abroad member abroad income and remitting
each category)   money
Gaunkar 53 0.44 25 0.47
Tenant 17 0.14 9 0.52
Mundkar 7 0.05 6 0.86
Total 77 0.213 40 0.52
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in general, have held on to the private land they had before the new
legislation. Overall this means that land ownership is now more equitable
than it was in the pre-tenancy legislation situation.
The survey also indicates that there has been significant out-migration
of farmers from Goa (See table). As expected, the majority of the
households who had migration in the family were Gaunkar households.
A significant factor contributing to migration is the number of years land
remained fallow. Seventy three households reported having fallow lands
due to salinity ingress. This gives a strong indication that a decline in
land productivity has forced many people to leave their farms.
CO-OPERATION BREAKS DOWN
An analysis of the historical developments that followed the tenancy
legislation changes gives a good indication as to why the new laws had
the effect they did on Goa’s farmers and farms. Management of village
affairs was transferred from the Communidades in the post-1961 situation
by two local-level bodies – the Panchayats (local government) and a
Tenants’ Association. The Panchayats did not have the mandate, the
incentive or the financial strength to maintain the large agrarian public
works that had earlier been carried out by the Gaunkars. The Tenants’
Association, which was given the responsibility for land maintenance
and was supposed to bring together the tenants who had benefited from
the legislation, failed to sustain itself as an institution and was unable to
undertake these activities. It is also evident that there was wide-spread
free riding on the part of tenants in
the new regime – another reason
why the Tenants Associations did
not sustain collective action.
Currently, tenants do not even
undertake minor repairs of
embankments and leave it entirely
to the state to do this work.
Unfortunately, the state’s
environmental management
mechanism is cumbersome and
difficult to activate. It also lacks
local participation. In financial
terms the picture is no more
positive. Even though there has
been an increase in levels of
nominal expenditure on soil
conservation since the mid-60’s,
in real terms there has been a
substantial decline. Given this
situation - reduced local
participation in environmental
management and a decline in real
expenditures - it is not surprising
that embankment maintenance





Mukhopadhyay’s study shows that
when the Communidades lost their
monopoly over agricultural land
management, this led to a decline
in the public works they used to
carry out. This, in turn led to two
key developments: (a) increased
salinity ingress into farmers’ fields,
and (b) resulted in the exit of
disenfranchised Gaunkars from the
agrarian economy.
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It is commonly argued that security of tenure is a pre-condition for people
to undertake conservation measures. By this argument the security of
tenure that was heralded by the 1960’s legislation should have led to
better land conservation and management in Goa. Mukhopadhyay’s
finding are in direct contradiction to this: in the new regime homogeneity
and security increased but cooperation to maintain embankments did
not.
The critical question is therefore ‘why did cooperation not emerge?’ There
are a number of possible answers. Firstly, clear rules governing the
punishment of those who do not co-operate on public land management
works (and the willingness to impose such rules) seem to be missing in
the post-tenancy institutional arrangement. Such rules are a key way of
ensuring co-operation. In comparison, when the Communidades had
the right to auction their lands prior to tenancy legislation, non-cooperation
led to eviction and the cancellation of tenures. Secondly, it is clear that
many of the previous managers of the agrarian system (Gaunkars)
withdrew from village affairs after the new legislation came into play. This
created a power vacuum which the new management institutions were
not able to fill. Moreover, without a prior history of cooperation, the tenants
failed to create new self-sustaining institutions even though there were
state incentives to do so.
All of these possibilities point to one certainty - that the replacement of
an organic local institution with one imposed by legislation can, at best,
have unanticipated consequences. This means that when public policy
involves institutional transition, there may be tradeoffs involved between
equity and sustainability. The potential for such unexpected repercussions
should be kept in mind by all policy makers and planners.
